Examining Japan’s Remilitarisation

Aishwarya Jain

Introduction

In contemporary military politics, Japan is perhaps the most well-known for the “No War” clause enshrined in Article 9 of its constitution. The clause was a landmark after the atrocities of World War II, as the Japanese government formally renounced war as a right of sovereignty and refused to settle disputes using military force. Yet, the country preserved its right to defend itself from hostile actors by creating the ‘Self-Defense Force’ (Jieitai in Japanese).

In the aftermath of the war, the country adopted the Yoshida Doctrine, which prioritized rebuilding domestic infrastructure and the economy while relying on the United States (U.S.) for security (Chai, 1997). In 1960, the budget for the Self-Defense Force comprised about 1.08% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the years following, the budget fell even further, reaching its lowest point at 0.8% [refer to Table 1]. Between 1974 and 1976, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki’s cabinet advocated for and set the precedent for military spending to remain at or below 1% of the Gross National Product (Auer, 1988). In 1980, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira furthered this approach by postulating three levels of national security measures for the country. These included: (i) self-defense (ii) efforts to promote an international system favorable to Japan’s security and (iii) to promote regional security (Akaha, 1991). 

While the defense spending of the country remained consistent, it came under popular scrutiny in the 1990s, as it became the third-largest defense budget in the world (Auer, 1990). This scrutiny was further fueled by a broader interpretation of Article 9, which began permitting specific offensive weaponry and arrangements for collective defense arrangements. 

In 1987, the country ‘scrapped’ its 1% ceiling on the military budget (Hook, 1988). However, that year, the military budget remained at a modest 0.96% of the GDP (World Bank, 2023). Japan’s military budget remained safely under 1% of the GDP till 2018 [refer to Table 2]. In 2019, military expenditure was nearly 1% of the GDP, and in 2020, for the first time since 1960, military spending exceeded the norm at 1.02% of the GDP. Despite the Liberal Democratic Party holding power almost continuously since 1955, it was re-elected in 2021 on a pledge to double the defense spending by 2027 (McGerty & Waldwyn, 2022).

 From 2020 onwards, the country's military expenditure continued to rise. In December 2022, the Ministry of Defense released two documents entitled ‘National Security Strategy of Japan’ (NSS) and ‘National Defense Strategy’ (NDS). These documents emphasized “strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense” and sought to add integrated air and missile defense capabilities. The strategy (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2022a; Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2022b) also put regional security to the forefront, adding: 

“In addition, if Japan possesses a defense capability to enable disrupting and defeating invasion, this capability, coupled with that of the United States, Japan’s ally, will be able to deter not only invasion against Japan but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated.” 

The 2023 budget proposal is the first one after the implementation of the NSS and NDS, recording a jump of nearly 26.3% from last year’s budget (Liang & Tian, 2023). The “trigger” for this drastic change in policy was most likely the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which destabilized the existing international order (Kortunov, 2022), marking the collapse of the post-Cold War global security environment. The ripple effect of the war first reached Russia’s most immediate neighbors, China and North Korea.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, scholars have speculated that China’s policy on its territorial claims over Taiwan may turn more aggressive. In 2022, Chinese incursions in Taiwanese airspace nearly doubled, increasing regional tensions (France-Presse, 2023). 

As recently as September 2023, 20 Chinese military aircraft reportedly entered Taiwan’s air defense zone, and at least four of these crossed the median line between the two countries (Blanchard, 2023). Meanwhile, North Korea has openly supported Russia, to the extent of voting against condemning the country for its military operation (Ha & Shin, 2022). In September 2023, the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, visited Russia, sparking a “warning” about weapons exchange from U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller. He added that the U.S. “will not hesitate to impose sanctions if and when appropriate” (U.S. Department of State, 2023). 

The Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrably contributed to significant instability in Northeast Asia, leading to an arms race between the countries (Hawkins, Davidson, McCurry, Ratcliffe, & Hurst, 2023). These regional security concerns are at the forefront of Japan’s budget increase. Historically, poor relations with China and an unpredictable North Korea are driving Japan’s need to acquire arms and remilitarize itself. Relations between China and Japan have deteriorated further, with Japan’s decision to release water from the Fukushima Power Plant into the Pacific Ocean (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023). China subsequently banned the import of seafood from the country, claiming that the water is nuclear contaminated and may harm the health of Chinese consumers (General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, 2023). Japan also stated in its 2023 military budget proposal that North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and is preparing for a nuclear test, provoking the international community (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2023). In a statement (BBC, 2022), Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said, 

“Unfortunately, in the vicinity of our country, there are countries carrying out activities such as enhancement of nuclear capability, a rapid military build-up, and unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force." 

Notably, Japan continues to acknowledge the U.S. as a security ally in its renewed policy. The U.S. The Department of Defense released a statement welcoming the change in Japan’s military policy, stating, “The ministers firmly reiterated their commitment to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023). It does not seem likely that Japan will sever its military alliance with the U.S. in the foreseeable future. However, as the international trend for self-dependence grows and tensions multiply, complete reliance on the U.S. may render the country incapable of providing for its citizens during a crisis.  

So far, China has not expressed its opinion on the change, while South Korea has conveyed its support for increased military spending as an unusual ally (Choi & Park, 2022; Kelly, 2023). Japan and South Korea have been making efforts to improve ties, and South Korea’s support for the Japanese military budget may be instrumental in garnering regional security (Park, 2022). 

The new policy may also allow Japan to assist other nations, especially those involved in the South China Sea conflict. In early 2023, Japan and the Philippines agreed to boost defense ties (Yamaguchi, 2023). A year earlier, Japan committed to improving defense cooperation with India for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2022). In September 2023, Japan appointed a government official to act as its “de facto defense attache” in Taiwan (Asia News International, 2023). Japan has been actively enhancing its defense ties in the region. 

Japan’s remilitarization is likely to deeply influence international order in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years. Depending on Japan’s success in implementing its defense policy and gathering a strategic arsenal, the country may become a dominant player in the geopolitical conflict in the coming years. 

About the Author

Aishwarya Jain is a junior research affiliate at the Centre for East Asian Studies. Her interests include geopolitics and trade economics in the Indo-Pacific region, with special focus on how contemporary history has defined domestic and foreign policy in countries. She enjoys working on data-driven articles and aims to understand the impact of media on policy-making.

Perspective, #13, 02 February 2024 | Centre for East Asian Studies